sea eagle 31 sailboat

Review of Sea Eagle 31

Basic specs..

The hull is made of fibreglass. Generally, a hull made of fibreglass requires only a minimum of maintenance during the sailing season. And outside the sailing season, just bottom cleaning and perhaps anti-fouling painting once a year - a few hours of work, that's all.

The boat is equipped with 246.0 liter fresh water capacity.

The boat equipped with a masthead rig. The advantage of a masthead rig is its simplicity and the fact that a given sail area - compared with a fractional rig - can be carried lower and thus with less heeling moment.

The Sea Eagle 31 is equipped with a fin keel. A boat with a fin keel is more manoeuvrable but has less directional stability than a similar boat with a full keel.

The boat can enter even shallow marinas as the draft is just about 1.45 - 1.55 meter (4.76 - 5.06 ft) dependent on the load. See immersion rate below.

Sailing characteristics

This section covers widely used rules of thumb to describe the sailing characteristics. Please note that even though the calculations are correct, the interpretation of the results might not be valid for extreme boats.

What is Capsize Screening Formula (CSF)?

The capsize screening value for Sea Eagle 31 is 1.78, indicating that this boat could - if evaluated by this formula alone - be accepted to participate in ocean races.

What is Theoretical Maximum Hull Speed?

The theoretical maximal speed of a displacement boat of this length is 7.0 knots. The term "Theoretical Maximum Hull Speed" is widely used even though a boat can sail faster. The term shall be interpreted as above the theoretical speed a great additional power is necessary for a small gain in speed.

The immersion rate is defined as the weight required to sink the boat a certain level. The immersion rate for Sea Eagle 31 is about 175 kg/cm, alternatively 984 lbs/inch. Meaning: if you load 175 kg cargo on the boat then it will sink 1 cm. Alternatively, if you load 984 lbs cargo on the boat it will sink 1 inch.

Sailing statistics

This section is statistical comparison with similar boats of the same category. The basis of the following statistical computations is our unique database with more than 26,000 different boat types and 350,000 data points.

What is Motion Comfort Ratio (MCR)?

What is L/B (Length Beam Ratio)?

What is a Ballast Ratio?

What is Displacement Length Ratio?

What is SA/D (Sail Area Displacement ratio)?

Maintenance

When buying anti-fouling bottom paint, it's nice to know how much to buy. The surface of the wet bottom is about 29m 2 (312 ft 2 ). Based on this, your favourite maritime shop can tell you the quantity you need.

Are your sails worn out? You might find your next sail here: Sails for Sale

If you need to renew parts of your running rig and is not quite sure of the dimensions, you may find the estimates computed below useful.

This section is reserved boat owner's modifications, improvements, etc. Here you might find (or contribute with) inspiration for your boat.

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• Sailboat Guide

Sea Eagle 31

Sea Eagle 31 is a 31 ′ 0 ″ / 9.5 m monohull sailboat designed by Stan Huntingford and built by C&L Marine Corp between 1979 and 1982.

Rig and Sails

Auxilary power, accomodations, calculations.

The theoretical maximum speed that a displacement hull can move efficiently through the water is determined by it's waterline length and displacement. It may be unable to reach this speed if the boat is underpowered or heavily loaded, though it may exceed this speed given enough power. Read more.

Classic hull speed formula:

Hull Speed = 1.34 x √LWL

Max Speed/Length ratio = 8.26 ÷ Displacement/Length ratio .311 Hull Speed = Max Speed/Length ratio x √LWL

Sail Area / Displacement Ratio

A measure of the power of the sails relative to the weight of the boat. The higher the number, the higher the performance, but the harder the boat will be to handle. This ratio is a "non-dimensional" value that facilitates comparisons between boats of different types and sizes. Read more.

SA/D = SA ÷ (D ÷ 64) 2/3

• SA : Sail area in square feet, derived by adding the mainsail area to 100% of the foretriangle area (the lateral area above the deck between the mast and the forestay).
• D : Displacement in pounds.

Ballast / Displacement Ratio

A measure of the stability of a boat's hull that suggests how well a monohull will stand up to its sails. The ballast displacement ratio indicates how much of the weight of a boat is placed for maximum stability against capsizing and is an indicator of stiffness and resistance to capsize.

Ballast / Displacement * 100

Displacement / Length Ratio

A measure of the weight of the boat relative to it's length at the waterline. The higher a boat’s D/L ratio, the more easily it will carry a load and the more comfortable its motion will be. The lower a boat's ratio is, the less power it takes to drive the boat to its nominal hull speed or beyond. Read more.

D/L = (D ÷ 2240) ÷ (0.01 x LWL)³

• D: Displacement of the boat in pounds.
• LWL: Waterline length in feet

Comfort Ratio

This ratio assess how quickly and abruptly a boat’s hull reacts to waves in a significant seaway, these being the elements of a boat’s motion most likely to cause seasickness. Read more.

Comfort ratio = D ÷ (.65 x (.7 LWL + .3 LOA) x Beam 1.33 )

• D: Displacement of the boat in pounds
• LOA: Length overall in feet
• Beam: Width of boat at the widest point in feet

Capsize Screening Formula

This formula attempts to indicate whether a given boat might be too wide and light to readily right itself after being overturned in extreme conditions. Read more.

CSV = Beam ÷ ³√(D / 64)

Built in Taiwan. 10 imported to US. Information and images courtesy of SEA EAGLE owner Dennis Johnson.

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Sea eagle 31

The sea eagle 31 is a 31.0ft masthead sloop designed by stan huntingford and built in fiberglass by c&l marine corp.(taiwan) between 1979 and 1982..

The Sea eagle 31 is a moderate weight sailboat which is slightly under powered. It is very stable / stiff and has an excellent righting capability if capsized. It is best suited as a bluewater cruising boat. The fuel capacity is originally small. There is a short water supply range.

Sea eagle 31 for sale elsewhere on the web:

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SEA EAGLE 31

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SEA EAGLE 31

SEA EAGLE 31 and designed by Stan Huntingford. Her first hull was built in 1979 with an overall lengh of 9.45 m or 31.00 ft long

SEA EAGLE 31 Sailboat Specifications​

Performance

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• Yachting World
• Digital Edition

Sea Eagle II: The inside story of the world’s largest aluminium sailing yacht

• June 17, 2020

Rupert Holmes talks to the build and design teams behind the 81m Royal Huisman flagship Sea Eagle II, which recently completed her sea trials off the coast of the Netherlands

Royal Huisman has an enviable track record of producing superlative sailing superyachts , with hundreds of projects completed to date. Yet the latest vessel to leave the shipyard is extraordinary even by these standards. She is the world’s largest aluminium yacht and is one of the top ten biggest sailing yachts ever built. 

Sea Eagle II is a magnificent 81m/266ft three-masted Panamax schooner, created by the same Dykstra and Mark Whiteley Design collaboration that produced the stunning 56m/186ft Royal Huisman ketch Aquarius just over a year ago. 

Her very experienced owner has sailed all his life and spent a lot of time at sea. “ Sailing around the world in the weekends is a phrase often used to outline his days on board,” says Royal Huisman project manager Arjo Spans. He is also a repeat client – the original Sea Eagle is a 43m/143ft Frers/Rhoades Young design launched by the Dutch yard in 2015. 

Sea Eagle II is due to be delivered to her owner in July 2020. Photo: Tom Van Oossanen

Initially the brief for the new boat was for a more classical yacht, similar to the 79m/259ft three-masted gaff schooner Athena , which Royal Huisman built for Silicon Valley mogul Jim Clark in 2004. However, the owner quickly realised he would prefer a more modern yacht: a fast-looking hull shape with straight lines, long waterline and plumb bow. The concept of Sea Eagle II was born. 

“Having worked with him to build the original Sea Eagle , we understood the owner’s priorities from the start,” says Spans. “These are: low maintenance, functionality, and safety, including ease of moving around the yacht, even when heeled at sea.

“For each of the key aspects of the boat he asked for three proposals, he would then choose one of them and leave us to implement it,” Spans adds. “He put a huge amount of trust in the shipyard and in our craftsmanship.”

Article continues below…

Sailing around Cape Horn on the world’s largest ketch Aquijo

When asked to help guide the 86m/282ft ketch Aquijo for a cruise in Tierra del Fuego and a Cape Horn…

Royal Huisman reveals 116ft ‘floating resort’ catamaran superyacht concept

“This is not a change in direction; it is an expansion of possibilities,” says Jan Timmerman, CEO of the 136-year-old…

The scale of this yacht is nothing short of astounding. The sleek hull lines belie the 4m/13ft freeboard and the two-tier deckhouse, including a half-raised bridge, looks entirely in proportion. The main deck-level accommodation has a huge expanse of glass, with the 360º view interrupted only by minimal mullions. There are also acres of cockpit space, with room left over for a long sweep of uncluttered aft deck.

Mark Whiteley was responsible for developing the interior and refining the exterior styling. He created a simple and modern style for the interior, with straight lines. Lacquered Alpi walnut wall panels, brushed natural oak floors and dark stained wenge trims are complemented by light colour leather handrails and upholstered wall panels.

Part of the brief was for the yacht to be able to host business meetings – the forward part of the superstructure therefore includes a large saloon with expansive seating, plus a 16-seat table for formal dining.

The largest winches are capable of a tremendous 18-tonne pulling load. Photo: Rondal

A technical challenge 

Dykstra Naval Architects drew a narrow and efficient hull shape with a maximum beam of only 12.4m/40ft, while displacement has been kept down to a relatively light 1,050 tonnes at full load. The final shape was achieved following extensive computational flow dynamics (CFD) calculations, velocity prediction programming (VPP), and testing in both tow tanks and wind tunnels. These all helped to determine sail balance, keel position and predicted rudder angles.

The plumb bow is balanced by a modest, but graceful, stern overhang, with a contemporary, relatively wide transom at deck level. Twin knuckle lines extend aft from near the bow, merging into one amidships and then forming a chine aft. Right aft the hull has negative curvature on the flare below the chine, which gives interesting reflections in the gleaming paintwork.

The lead naval architect, Dykstra’s Erik Wassen, told me he introduced the knuckle lines to give the hull “a bolder and more interesting shape.” The owner liked the concept and Mark Whiteley helped to refine the detail. Wassen describes the underwater shape as being: “a very modern round bilge shape, with a nice slender hull that gives good sailing capabilities.” Appendages are a conventional fin keel and balanced rudder.

Photo: Priska van der Meulen

The latter presented an interesting technical challenge, according to Wassen. Initially they looked at fabricating the rudder stock in steel, but that alone would weigh three tonnes. Screening a number of alternatives led to a decision to use carbon for the stock, with a foam core section clad in a relatively thin composite skin for the blade. 

The result is what it’s producer, Royal Huisman’s sister company Rondal, believes to be the biggest ever carbon rudder, weighing only 1,250kg, which helps to keep weight out of the ends of the boat. The weight saving here also enabled the intended fore and aft trim to be achieved with the ballast in its optimal location.

The rudder includes load sensors to record and verify torque, side forces and bending moment while sailing. “There is not much load data available for rudders of this size of sailing yacht, so it’s very conservatively engineered,” says Spans. Fibre-optic sensors are incorporated to enable a database to be created that will help with designing future composite rudders for very large yachts.

Due to the distance of the helm stations from the rudder, the steering is via an electric-hydraulic system, which means there’s no feedback from the helm. The plan is to investigate whether data from the sensors can be used in a feedback system to give a more natural feel to steering the boat under sail. 

Structural engineering

This is one of the most interesting elements of yacht design, yet is all too often under appreciated. Extensive modelling showed a couple of unexpected problems that needed clever solutions during Sea Eagle II ’s design and engineering. 

Instead of the hull flexing smoothly under load, like an I-beam, the presence of a forward intermediate deck introduced hard spots in this area, resulting in stress concentrations at the forward end of the superstructure. This required a lot of design work to create a smooth transition of stress from the lower deck to the intermediate one and then on to the upper deck.

Structural engineering was extensively modelled for Sea Eagle II

The roof of the superstructure also posed a challenge, in that the inside surface of a beam needs to become shorter as it flexes. But the original plan for the aluminium roof wasn’t able to accommodate this, with the result the modelling showed stresses concentrating in the corners of the mullions and in the glass itself. 

The solution was to avoid welding the top of the mullions to the roof, opting instead for a flexible joint that allows for movement when necessary. Wassen likens it to the joints in large buildings that need to be included to allow for thermal expansion and contraction.

Whiteley also helped to refine the exterior styling. In addition to the detail of the knuckles, his input helped to refine the shapes – particularly curves and softening corners – in the superstructure.

COVID-19 restrictions meant her delivery date had to be pushed back by 3 months. Photo: Crea Fragma / Rondal

Panamax rig

The requirement to be able to clear the Bridge of the Americas at the Pacific end of the Panama canal called for the schooner rig with three equal masts. All are of carbon and are made by Rondal, with integrated sail handling systems and Carbo-Link carbon standing rigging.

Each mast has in-boom furling, while the aft two have staysails for use when reaching. The tank and wind tunnel testing was used to verify different headsail options, particularly to determine the differences between a large blade jib versus a large staysail or yankee.

“Obviously you have better windward performance with a large blade,” says Wassen, “but as soon as you bear away the yankee is much more forgiving in trimming, so we decided that made more sense.” A further advantage is that when the yankee is part furled the sheeting point remains the same. 

Rondal’s Integrated Sailing System consists of the three carbon Panamax masts with furling booms, hydraulic boomvangs, headsail furling systems, deck winches and equipment, captive winches and continuous solid carbon standing rigging by Carbo-Link, all equipped with load sensing capabilities. Photo: Rondal

In addition, a blade jib requires much higher sheet loads to maintain leech tension. Even though Sea Eagle II is a three-masted yacht, the yankee sheet loads are still predicted to reach 18 tonnes – but this still allows standard-size captive winches to be used, rather than larger custom-made units.

The Panamax limitation obviously poses the question as to whether sail area needed to be compromised to fulfil this criteria. However, this is clearly not the case for Sea Eagle II . Hull speed is close to 20 knots and the yacht is clearly capable of surfing at much higher speeds, despite being designed as a pure cruiser. This role, of course, suggests keeping heel angles to a maximum of 10-15°. 

Nevertheless, the VPP figures suggest potential boat speeds of 17-18 knots in 16 knots of true breeze with a true wind angle of 70°. “As soon as you can ease the sheets a little bit, we have a lot of sail area,” says Wassen, “so on a beam reach, I wouldn’t be surprised if a steady 20 knots is possible.” 

Specification

LOA: 81m (266ft) Air draught: 62m (205ft) Hull: Aluminium Guest accommodation: 11 Crew accommodation: 14 Exterior styling: Dykstra Naval Architects and Mark Whiteley Design Naval Architecture: Dykstra Naval Architects Interior design: Mark Whiteley Design Classification: Lloyd’s MCA (LY-3)

First published in the April 2020 edition of Supersail World.

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1979 Sea Eagle 31 | Pacific Eagle Long Beach, California, United States

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SEA EAGLE 31

SEA EAGLE 31 Specifications

Hull Type: Fin with rudder on skeg Rigging Type: Masthead Sloop LOA: 31.00 ft / 9.45 m LWL: 27.33 ft / 8.33 m S.A. (reported): 488.00 ft² / 45.34 m² Beam: 10.33 ft / 3.15 m Displacement: 12,500.00 lb / 5,670 kg Ballast: 5,125.00 lb / 2,325 kg Max Draft: 4.75 ft / 1.45 m Construction: FG Airex hull/ balsa deck First Built: 1979 Last Built: 1982 Designer: Stan Huntingford

Type Engine: Diesel HP: 20 Fuel: 35 gals / 132 L Water: 65 gals / 246 L Hull Speed: 7.01 kn

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The contemporary flybridge schooner, SEA EAGLE is a true sailing yacht. This 81m / 266ft  beauty immediately earned her place alongside the shipyard’s Athena in the elite club of the world’s 10 largest sailing yachts. Delivered in 2020 under the shadow of the pandemic, SEA EAGLE II’s arrival on the superyacht scene was inevitably low-key.

Following her extensive world exploration, and with over 45,000 nm under her keel, Royal Huisman is pleased to set matters right and place this magnificent schooner in the spotlight she deserves: please find the article “THE SEA EAGLE SOARS”: link

DATA & DIMENSIONS

SEA EAGLE is currently Royal Huisman’s largest yacht. Project 410, the 85m / 280ft sloop, will take over this title on delivery. Nearly 60 years of aluminum yacht-building experience have provided the shipyard with a level of expertise in constructing hulls of this material that few shipyards can match. This is especially true for sailing yachts of this size. The advantages are equally large: lightness, acceleration, strength and fuel-efficiency being just a few characteristics of a true sailing yacht versus a heavy, sail-assisted motor yacht.

The brief for SEA EAGLE was to create an extremely comfortable and spacious yacht with good sea keeping and exceptional amenities for both guests and crew. She had to offer outstanding passage-making performance so that the owner could take in as much of the world under sail as possible. She had to be a true sailor’s yacht – practical, powerful, safe and easily managed. Finally, she had to be functional, favoring simplicity and reliability over unnecessary frills.

YOU MIGHT LIKE THIS TOO:

THE SEA EAGLE SOARS

SUPER-SIZED SAILING YACHTS BY ROYAL HUISMAN

SEA EAGLE II: ‘Best Naval Architecture Sailing Yachts’

VOLLENHOVE: LOCATION, QUALITY, CULTURE.

P&G YACHTING

SEA EAGLE II SPREADS HER WINGS

UNIQUE AND FLEXIBLE

THE PERFECT COMBINATION

ROYAL HUISMAN TURNS ITS LARGEST HULL EVER

THE BUILD HAS STARTED!

PASSION FOR PERFECTION

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Sea Eagle 31 - Sailboat Sheets

Pre-Spec sailboat sheets for your Sea Eagle 31. Genoa, gennaker and spinnaker shets to fit your cruising or racing sailing style. Full range of options.

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2024

Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 8, 2024, 10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The data cut-off for this product was 2:45pm ET on August 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: Russian sources are currently shifting much of their reporting to cover the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and as a result are not providing the same level of detail about the situation along the frontline in Ukraine.

Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security. ISW will not make forecasts about what Ukrainian forces might or might not do or where or when they might do it. ISW will continue to map, track, and evaluate operations as they unfold but will not offer insight into Ukrainian planning, tactics, or techniques. ISW is not prepared to map control of terrain within Russia at this time and will instead map observed events associated with the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory as well the maximalist extent of claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances. Maximalist claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances within Russia do not represent territory that ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have seized or control. Inferring predictions about Ukrainian operations from ISW maps and assessments that do not explicitly offer such predictions is inappropriate and not in accord with their intended use.

Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced as far as Kromskiye Byki and Molyutino (up to 35 kilometers from the international border and 17 kilometers southeast of Lgov) but noted that these are small groups not immediately trying to hold territory. [1] Russian milbloggers issued contradictory claims about Ukrainian positions in Sudzha (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), with some milbloggers claiming that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only seized part of the settlement. [2] Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced towards Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced further north of Sudzha along the 38K-024 highway near Anastasyevka. [3] Geolocated footage published on August 7 and 8 shows Ukrainian forces operating within Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha) and north of Zaoleshenka (northwest of Sudzha), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Goncharovka. [4] A geolocated photo shows Ukrainian forces operating within Novoivanovka (10km north of the international border and northwest of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novoivanovka and Bogdanovka (northwest of Sudzha). [5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced northwest of Sudzha into Malaya Loknya and to the outskirts of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; northeast of Sudzha near Kruglenkoye, Martynovka, and Bolshoye Soldatskoye; and east of Sudzha near Mirny, although two Russian milbloggers denied claims that Ukrainian forces are operating near and within Bolshoye Soldatskoye. [6] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border) and that Ukrainian forces attacked within Snagost (south of Korenevo) and near Olgovka (east of Korenevo). [7]

Russian milbloggers claimed that small Ukrainian armored groups are advancing further into the Russian rear and bypassing Russian fortifications before engaging Russian forces and then withdrawing from the engagements without attempting to consolidate control over their furthest advances. [8] Russian milbloggers noted that the prevalence of these armored groups is leading to conflicting reporting because Ukrainian forces are able to quickly engage Russian forces near a settlement and then withdraw from the area. [9] Ukrainian forces appear to be able to use these small armored groups to conduct assaults past the engagement line due to the low density of Russian personnel in the border areas of Kursk Oblast. Larger Ukrainian units are reportedly operating in areas of Kursk Oblast closer to the international border and are reportedly consolidating and fortifying some positions. [10]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are successfully fielding novel and innovative tactics and technological capabilities during operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers have provided details on Ukrainian tactics and technological capabilities that they regard as innovative, but ISW will not describe such details at this time or point to specific sources in order to preserve Ukrainian operational security.

The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence. Putin held a virtual meeting with Kursk Oblast Acting Head Alexey Smirnov on August 8 about Ukraine's operations into the oblast and stated that he "generally know[s] the situation" but still would like to hear Smirnov's assessment of the situation. [11] Smirnov and Putin did not discuss Russian attempts to repel Ukrainian forces and portrayed the Russian government as effectively working to ensure civilian safety and social and monetary compensation. Russian milbloggers have highlighted concerns over the safety of Russian civilians and disorganized civilian evacuations. [12] Putin likely assesses that he must respond to the perceived threat to civilians in order to assure the Russian public that the situation is under control and avoid significant domestic discontent. Smirnov claimed on August 7 that the situation is "under [Putin's] personal control," directly linking Russian success in repelling Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and mitigating related civilian issues to Putin. [13] The Kremlin previously has portrayed itself as capable of swiftly responding to pro-Ukrainian raids into Russia, and the Kremlin likely assesses that significant Ukrainian territorial gains in Russia would pose a threat to the Kremlin's efforts to frame itself as a stable regime in control of the internal security situation within Russia and an effective manager of the war in Ukraine. [14]

If Russian reporting on the situation in Kursk Oblast is accurate and if the Russian military command perceives the situation to be the same as Russian sources have described, then the Russian military command has an array of likely courses of action (COAs) it could pursue to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW is not prepared at this time to assess which of these possible COAs is most likely, and it is possible that the Russian military command may not rely on only one COA to respond to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Russian military command's decision-making will be influenced by its perception of the size and capability of Ukrainian forces in the area, about which ISW makes no assessment. The following COAs are not presented in order of likelihood.

• COA 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. Russian authorities have repeatedly assured Russians that conscripts will not deploy to combat operations along the frontline in Ukraine, and instead, the Russian military command has relied on conscripts for staffing units in charge of border security functions along the international border with Ukraine. [15] Russian conscripts, FSB border guards, and elements of Chechen "Akhmat" units operating under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are reportedly currently operating in Kursk Oblast. [16] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) irregular forces, including elements of the "Dikaya Division of Donbas," the "Pyatnashka" Brigade, the "Arbat" Separate Guards Special Purpose Battalion, and the "Night Wolves" drone detachment, arrived in Kursk Oblast. [17] Elements of a battalion of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division's 217th VDV Regiment were reportedly defending a section of the border in Kursk Oblast as of late May 2024, suggesting that there may be some relatively more combat effective forces in the area, but the majority of Russian reporting indicates that most Russian forces operating in Kursk Oblast are elements of less combat effective units. [18] The Russian military command may pursue this COA should it assess that lower quality forces that would likely be less well equipped could effectively stop Ukrainian forces that have been reportedly successfully employing innovative tactics and technological capabilities. All of these forces are operating in the area of responsibility (AOR) of Russia's Northern Grouping of Forces, but it is unclear to what degree the Northern Grouping of Forces has authority over these elements' border security functions.
• COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel deployed to the border area in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts as of early May 2024 and reportedly intended to establish a grouping in the area that is between 50,000 to 75,000 personnel in size. [19] The Northern Grouping of Forces likely launched the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast before it reached its reported planned end strength and has since suffered heavy casualties that have likely constrained Russian efforts to build out the grouping. The Russian military command reportedly transferred an unspecified number of forces to the international border area near Kharkiv Oblast in late May and early June 2024, but it was unclear if the Russian military command planned to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. [20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on August 8 that the Russian military command began to redeploy forces likely from the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) from the Belgorod group of the Northern Grouping of Forces operating in the Vovchansk direction northeast of Kharkiv City to the group defending the international border in Kursk Oblast. [21] Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov attempted on August 7 to portray the Northern Grouping of Forces (as well as the FSB) as an effective defensive force, claiming that these forces stopped Ukraine's advances in Kursk Oblast and inflicted significant casualties. [22] The Northern Grouping of Forces has failed to achieve even its limited tactical objectives in northern Kharkiv Oblast since early May 2024 and its ability to conduct effective defensive operations and significant counterattacks is unclear. The redeployment of significant elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces to focus on pushing back Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast would likely further stretch these elements and create vulnerabilities in Russian defenses elsewhere along the border. The Russian military command may also seek to pursue this COA should it deem the Northern Grouping of Forces' offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast to be less of a priority than defensive operations in Kursk Oblast.
• COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory. Russian aviation currently conducts routine sorties to strike frontline and rear Ukrainian positions throughout the frontline, and the Russian military command may seek to leverage available aviation assets should it determine that the current forces in Kursk Oblast are ill-fitted to retake territory while aiming to avoid redeployments from elsewhere in the theater. The Russian military command may envision that both rotary- and fixed-wing aviation operations at scale in airspace over Kursk Oblast would allow Russian forces to blunt Ukrainian maneuver and prevent Ukrainian forces from securely consolidating positions and thereby allow the current Russian forces deployed in the area to more effectively conduct counterattacks and defensive operations. It is unclear whether the current Russian forces deployed to Kursk Oblast would be able to exploit the effects of large-scale Russian aviation operations over Kursk Oblast, however. It is also unclear if large-scale aviation operations over Kursk Oblast would disrupt Russia's ability to routinely use tactical aviation for glide bomb strikes throughout the frontline. Russian sources have indicated that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, including the "mobile groups" operating further into Russian territory, have significant air defense capabilities that would likely make large-scale Russian aviation operations in the area challenging. [26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating rotary-wing aircraft in certain areas of Kursk Oblast, which would suggest that current Russian air defense coverage in the area may be sparse and may facilitate even limited Ukrainian aviation operations that would further complicate the Russian military's ability to field aviation at scale over Kursk Oblast. [27] ISW has not yet observed confirmation of reported Ukrainian air and air defense capabilities in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces could also deploy ground-based strike capabilities at scale to areas in and near Kursk Oblast to constrain Ukrainian advances and disrupt Ukrainian consolidation at positions within Russia, but Russian forces have generally proven incapable of using longer-range strike capabilities to set conditions for the type of ground maneuver needed to quickly retake territory in Kursk Oblast.

The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have struggled to achieve operational surprise in the past year and a half of fighting due to the partially transparent battlefield in Ukraine. Ukraine's ability to achieve operational surprise highlights that the widespread visual and sensor-based transparency that both sides have established does not translate into a fully transparent battlefield, however, and that the belligerents in Ukraine can leverage ambiguity around operational intent to achieve operational surprise. One Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military command for failing to observe and react to Ukrainian forces allegedly massing on the border near Kursk Oblast. [28] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continually warned the Russian high command about a massing of Ukrainian forces along the border near Kursk Oblast but that the Russian command failed to adequately prepare for potential Ukrainian offensive operations. [29] Ukrainian forces would have successfully concealed their operational intent in order to achieve operational surprise if milblogger claims that Russian forces observed a buildup of Ukrainian forces in border areas are accurate. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have failed to internalize lessons learned about the difficulties of mechanized maneuver on an assumed transparent battlefield in Ukraine. [30] Ukraine, however, appears to be learning and adapting to this aspect of the battlefield given its ability to achieve apparent operational surprise in this instance .

Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 8 that Russia "brought the war to Ukraine" and must "feel what it has done" in response. [31] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhaylo Podolyak acknowledged the ongoing "events" in Kursk Oblast and noted that Russia is to blame for the situation, and an unnamed advisor to Zelensky also acknowledged the ongoing Ukrainian military operation into Kursk Oblast during an interview with the Washington Post on August 8. [32]

US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas. Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated during a press briefing on August 8 that Ukraine's operation into Kursk Oblast is consistent with US policy and that the US supports Ukraine's right to defend itself against attacks across the international border. [33] White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller also noted the Biden Administration's support for Ukraine's "common sense" and defensive actions on August 7. [34] Unnamed "US and Ukrainian officials" told CNN on August 8 that Ukrainian forces hope to disrupt and demoralize Russian forces and partially divert Russian forces from frontline areas in eastern Ukraine. [35]

Russian-backed Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba told Kremlin newswire TASS on August 8 that there are no plans to construct a Russian naval base at the Ochamchire port in Russian-controlled Abkhazia, Georgia. [36] Shamba noted that Russian forces have stationed border patrol boats at the port. Shamba stated in January 2024 that Russia was designing a permanent naval base in Abkhazia, however, and Russian-backed Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania announced in October 2023 that he signed an agreement with Russian authorities to construct the base near Ochamchire. [37] Naval News reported in July 2024 that the Russian Project 22870 support ship, which had been previously docked at its home port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, arrived at the Ochamchire port. [38] It is unclear why the Russian government would abandon its plans to construct a permanent naval base in Abkhazia, as Ukrainian strikes against Black Sea Fleet assets have largely rendered naval basing in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea useless and have forced Russia to seek a more permanent basing pattern in the eastern Black Sea. [39]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security.
• Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however.
• The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence.
• COA (Course of Action) 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.
• COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast.
• COA 3: The Russian military command may choose to redeploy operational reserves that it accumulated for its planned Summer 2024 offensive effort and/or relatively better provisioned and more combat effective frontline units to Kursk Oblast from elsewhere in the theater.
• COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory.
• The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia.
• Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast.
• US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on August 7 and 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. [40] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported on August 8 that Russian forces recently transferred an unspecified unit from occupied Luhansk Oblast to the Vovchansk direction and that Russian forces did not use tactical aviation in the Kharkiv direction on August 8. [41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Hlyboke. [42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove and Kolisnykivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novoserhiivka, Nevske, and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on August 7 and 8. [43]

Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on August 8 that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on August 5 against a command post of the Russian 2nd Battalion of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) near occupied Bohdanivka, Luhansk Oblast, killing the battalion's commander and several Russian officers. [44] ISW cannot independently confirm this report.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka, Spirne, and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 7 and 8. [45] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Ivano-Darivka and Pereizne. [46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, and east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske on August 7 and 8. [47] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar. [48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk on August 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to advance within Niu York (south of Toretsk) and that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in the area. [49] Russian forces also continued offensive operations near Toretsk, east of Toretsk near Pivnichne, and southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne on August 7 and 8. [50] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Niu York. [51]

Russian forces reportedly advanced east of Pokrovsk on August 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating east of Pokrovsk advanced up to the outskirts of Hrodivka and near Lysychne and Ivanivka. [52] Russian milbloggers also continued to claim that Russian forces seized Serhiivka (southeast of Pokrovsk). [53] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka; east of Pokrovsk near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Ivanivka, and Lysychne; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Zhelanne, Karlivka, and Yasnobrodivka on August 7 and 8. [54]

Russian forces reportedly advanced southwest of Donetsk City on August 8 but did not make confirmed gains in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Vodyane (southwest of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. [55] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, Vodyane, Volodymyrivka, and Vuhledar on August 7 and 8. [56] Elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City). [57]

Russian forces recently made marginal gains south of Velyka Novosilka in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area, but Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report fighting in the area on August 8. Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal gains northeast of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka). [58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 and 8. [59]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in the Dnipro direction (Kherson Oblast) on August 7 and 8. [60] Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta. [61]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defense systems shot down a Ukrainian drone over occupied Crimea on August 8. [62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 7 to 8. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk stated that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles from over the Sea of Azov, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Belgorod Oblast, and four Shahed-136/131 drones from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down two Kh-59 cruise missiles and four Shahed drones over Odesa, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts. [63]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues efforts to limit violations to Russian military operational security in Ukraine and control the distribution of information about the Russian military to the information space. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a law on August 8 that makes the use of electronic "gadgets" (personal phones and electronic devices) by Russian military personnel in the combat zone in Ukraine to perform tasks that are not part of their official duties a disciplinary offense punishable by up to 10 days of arrest. [64] The law does not apply to military personnel using electronic "gadgets" to perform their official duties, however. The law also states that military personnel who distribute information about Russian military activities, unit deployments, or servicemembers' families to the media or on the internet face the same punishment. Russian milbloggers previously widely criticized the State Duma proposals allowing for the punishment of servicemembers for using "gadgets" in the combat zone, claiming that this would significantly complicate Russian logistics, command and control, and operations in general, and the final law's permission for Russian personnel to use these devices to perform their official tasks are likely in response to this backlash. [65]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger posted footage on August 8 purportedly showing elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to deliver ammunition and evacuate wounded personnel in frontline areas of eastern Ukraine. [66] The milblogger claimed that acting Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov supported the production of the UGVs and noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) design bureau is testing several UGVs.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Independent Belarusian monitoring group The Belarusian Hajun project reported on August 8 that at least nine Russian Shahed-136/131 drones flew into Belarusian airspace from July 11 to 31. [67] The Hajun project reported that one drone fell in Belarus, that seven flew to Ukrainian airspace, and that it is unclear what happened to one drone. Belarusian forces are reportedly taking measures to protect against Russian drones by flying Su-30SM aircraft in southern Belarus during Russian air strikes against Ukraine and redeploying Belarusian helicopters to the Babruysk Airbase to shorten the flight time to the Ukrainian-Belarusian border to intercept drones.

Belarusian and Russian officials took further steps to increase Belarusian-Russian cooperation through the Union State. Union State Secretary Dmitry Mezentsev and Belarusian Security Council State Secretary Alexander Volfovich met in Minsk on August 8 and discussed the final draft of the Union State's Security Concept, which the Council of Ministers and the Supreme State Council of the Union State will reportedly consider in the near future. [68] Mezentsev and Volfovich reportedly discussed the Supreme State Council of the Union State's programs to improve Belarusian and Russian forces' infrastructure and rear facilities. Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov also met on August 8 in Minsk and reportedly discussed preparation for the signing of the Union State's Security Concept. [69] The National Bank of Belarus and Central Bank of Russia signed an agreement on August 7 on cooperation and information exchanges related to the supervision and control of the financial market, implementing aspects of the Treaty of the Establishment of the Union State.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/dva_majors/49120 ; https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16342 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127888 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25888

[2] https://t.me/notes_veterans/18606 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/18628 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25905 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58028 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58026 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25900 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74285  ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27567 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127828 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25902 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16342 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58037 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  ; https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/rybar/62546

[3] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6299?single ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/1962 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49143 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49120  ; https://t.me/mig41/35945 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74283 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74295  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49096

[4] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1821621690717085870 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/38431 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74252 ; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9412 ; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1821345068885647545 ; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1821311435131027729 ;  ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  

[5] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27567 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13548 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127920 ; https://x.com/ian_matveev/status/1821598298286731687 ; https://x.com/Militarylandnet/status/1821604070735614061 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/84455 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132781

[6] https://t.me/dva_majors/49120 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/rybar/62576 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127884 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127830 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25905 ; http://t.me/mig41/35981 ; https://t.me/rybar/62563 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/1958 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74296 ; https://t.me/sashakots/48269 ; https://t.me/rybar/62576 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127884 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  

; https://t.me/dva_majors/49075 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18571 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127888 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25888 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49087 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13548 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13589

[7] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58037 ; https://t.me/rybar/62546 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132710 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/18601 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25904 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127828 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132741 ; https://t.me/mig41/35943 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74267 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74272 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49154 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/38853

[8] https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13527 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132810

[9] https://t.me/rybar/62580 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132810

[10] https://t.me/dva_majors/49133 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13578 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/32633; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58052

[11] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74725

[12] https://t.me/russianocontext/4252 ; https://t.me/rybar/62581 ; https://t.me/breakingmash/56581 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127884 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25902 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13571

[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/264864 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/264865; https://t.me/tass_agency/264868 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2024

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060223

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024

[16] https://t.me/rybar/62546 ; ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12484 ; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1821300140755271836 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/49735 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58023 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/41905 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12484 ; https://t.me/russianocontext/4248 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19726 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49141 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74281 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49098 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49158 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/38851

[17] https://t.me/motopatriot/25903 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25902

[18] https://t.me/motopatriot/25902 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2024

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2024

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060824

[21] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2101

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar08072024

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062024 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate080122 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060824

[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58025

[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/49083 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13542 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13537

[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58056 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58053

[28] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16803

[29] https://t.me/rybar/62558 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16803

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024

[31] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/rosiya-prinesla-vijnu-na-nashu-zemlyu-j-povinna-vidchuvati-s-92549

[32] https://t.me/M_Podolyak/273 ; https://t.me/M_Podolyak/274 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/08/ukraine-kursk-russia-occupied-war/

[33] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3867296/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-conference/

[34] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/08/07/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-66/ ; https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-7-2024/

[35] https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/08/europe/russia-ukrainian-incursion-intl/index.html

[36] https://t.me/tass_agency/265131  

[37] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6452529 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2023

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024

[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13524  

[41] https://t.me/otukharkiv/670 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/08/vijska-rf-ne-vidhodyat-z-harkivshhyny-popry-boyi-u-kurskij-oblasti/

[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13524  

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[44] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12504 ; https://t.me/pechalbeda200/101483

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[46] https://t.me/rusich_army/16341

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/41903

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/21452 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13564 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25879

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ;

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/21459

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot/25873 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25874 ; https://t.me/rybar/62568

[53] https://t.me/rybar/62568  ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25878 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74303  ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132772 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74246 ; https://t.me/rybar/62568 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132717

[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27564 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132772

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/49060

[58] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/18220; https://t.me/ukraine20obsp/770

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ;

[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/21467

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/41921

[63] https://t.me/ComAFUA/377

[64] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21561113; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202408080028

[65] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072324

[66] https://t.me/rybar/62562

[67] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8032

[68] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/zavershena-sovmestnaja-rabota-nad-proektom-kontseptsii-bezopasnosti-sojuznogo-gosudarstva-652996-2024/

[69] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/ryzhenkov-i-gryzlov-obsudili-podgotovku-proekta-belorussko-rossijskogo-dogovora-o-garantijah-653049-2024/; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43980

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What to Know About Ukraine’s Cross-Border Assault Into Russia

The incursion caught Russia by surprise and signified a shift in tactics for Kyiv after more than two years of war with Russia.

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By Andrew E. Kramer Constant Méheut Kim Barker Anton Troianovski and Cassandra Vinograd

Ukraine pressed ahead with its offensive inside Russian territory on Sunday , pushing toward more villages and towns nearly two weeks into the first significant foreign incursion in Russia since World War II.

But even as the Ukrainian army was advancing in Russia’s western Kursk region, its troops were steadily losing ground on their own territory. The Russian military is now about eight miles from the town of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine, according to open-source battlefield maps . The capture of Pokrovsk, a Ukrainian stronghold, would bring Moscow one step closer to its long-held goal of capturing the entire Donetsk region.

That underscored the gamble Ukraine’s army took when it crossed into Russia: throwing its forces into a daring offensive that risked weakening its own positions on the eastern front.

Whether that strategy will prove advantageous remains to be seen, analysts say.

On the political front, the offensive has already had some success: Ukraine’s rapid advance has embarrassed the Kremlin and has altered the narrative of a war in which Kyiv’s forces had been on the back foot for months.

Here’s what to know about Ukraine’s cross-border operation, which President Biden said last week was creating a “real dilemma” for the Russian government.

What happened?

Ukrainian troops and armored vehicles stormed into the Kursk region of western Russia on Aug. 6 , swiftly pushing through Russian defenses and capturing several villages.

Held by Ukraine

as of Aug. 13

Sverdlikovo

Sievierodonetsk

Area controlled

Zaporizhzhia

Sea of Azov

Ukrainian incursion

Source: Institute for the Study of War with American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project

By Veronica Penney

The assault, prepared in the utmost secrecy , opened a new front in the 30-month war and caught not only Russia off guard: Some Ukrainian soldiers and U.S. officials also said they lacked advance notice.

Analysts and Western officials estimate that Ukraine deployed about 1,000 troops at the start of the incursion. But military analysts say that it has since poured more troops into the operation to try to hold and expand its positions.

How far into Russia have Ukrainian troops advanced?

Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, Ukraine’s top commander, said last week that his army now controlled more than 80 Russian settlements in the Kursk region, including Sudzha , a town of 6,000 residents. His claims could not be independently verified, although analysts say that Sudzha is highly likely to be under full Ukrainian control.

Ukraine’s advance in the Kursk region has slowed in recent days, according to open-source maps of the battlefield based on combat footage and satellite images, as Russia sends in more reinforcements. The Ukrainian army appears to be trying to dig in along the border area rather than pushing deeper into Russia.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine acknowledged that on Saturday, saying : “Now we are reinforcing our positions. The foothold of our presence is getting stronger.”

Why is this significant?

Kyiv has regularly bombarded Russian oil refineries and airfields with drones since Moscow’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. It has also helped stage two other ground attacks in Russia. Those, however, were smaller forays by Russian exile groups backed by the Ukrainian army, and they ended in quick retreats.

Until two weeks ago, Ukrainian forces had not counterattacked in Russia. The gains in Kursk are the quickest for Ukrainian forces since they reclaimed the Kherson region of their own country in November 2022.

How has the Kremlin responded?

As Ukrainian forces pushed deeper into Russia, Moscow scrambled to shore up its defenses, and President Vladimir V. Putin convened his security services to coordinate a response. The Russian military said it was sending more troops and armored vehicles to try to repel the attack, with Russian television broadcasting images of columns of military trucks.

Military analysts and U.S. officials have said the Russian command had so far brought in reinforcements mainly from within Russia so as to not deplete its units on the Ukrainian battlefield, in what they described as a disorganized effort.

“Russia is still pulling together its reaction,” Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, NATO’s top military commander, said last week during a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He described the Russian response as having been “fairly slow and scattered” as the authorities sorted out which military and security forces should take the lead.

And what about Putin?

The incursion has embarrassed Mr. Putin and his military establishment, prompting questions about Russia’s level of preparedness .

Underscoring how the attack rattled the Kremlin, Mr. Putin lashed out last week at the West in a tense televised meeting with his top officials. “The West is fighting us with the hands of the Ukrainians,” he said, repeating his frequent depiction of the war, which he started, as a proxy campaign against Russia by the West.

Ukraine’s incursion has brought the war into Russia like it never has before, and tens of thousands of civilians have evacuated the border area.

What is the goal of Ukraine’s incursion?

Analysts say that Ukraine’s offensive has two main aims : to draw Russian forces from the front lines in eastern Ukraine and to seize territory that could serve as a bargaining chip in future peace talks.

Mykhailo Podolyak, a top Ukrainian presidential adviser, said last week that Russia would be forced to the negotiating table only through suffering “significant tactical defeats.”

“In the Kursk region, we can clearly see how the military tool is being used objectively to persuade” Russia to enter “a fair negotiation process,” he wrote on social media .

The operation has offered a much-needed morale boost for Ukrainians, whose forces have been losing ground to Russian troops for months.

But military analysts have questioned whether Kyiv’s cross-border assault is worth the risk, given that Ukrainian forces are already stretched on the front lines of their own country.

How is it affecting the fight inside Ukraine?

Russian forces have been pummeling Ukrainian troops in the east even as Moscow races to respond to the incursion into Kursk , according to analysts, Western officials and Ukrainian soldiers.

Russia has begun to withdraw small numbers of troops from Ukraine, they said, to try to help repel the Ukrainians, but not enough to significantly affect the overall battlefield for now.

Senior American officials have said privately that they understood Kyiv’s need to change the narrative of the war, but that they were skeptical that Ukraine could hold the territory long enough to force Russia to divert significant resources from the front lines in eastern and southern Ukraine.

While Kyiv’s allies have in the past been wary that Ukrainian incursions in Russia could escalate the war, the European Union’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell Fontelles, said last week that Ukraine had the bloc’s “ full support .”

Ukraine has used some Western-supplied weapons in the Kursk operation. But so far, the United States and Britain, two of Kyiv’s closes allies, have said the incursion did not violate their policies.”

What happens next?

As the Ukrainian offensive approaches its two-week mark, analysts say that Kyiv has several options, each with its own challenges.

Ukrainian forces could try to keep pushing farther into Russia, but that will become harder as Russian reinforcements arrive and Ukraine’s supply lines are stretched.

They could keep digging into the territory they now hold and try to defend it, but that could expose fixed Ukrainian positions to potentially devastating Russian airstrikes.

Or, battered by continual losses in eastern Ukraine, they could decide that they have made their point and pull back.

Thibault Fouillet, the deputy director of the Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies, a French research center, said Ukraine’s next move would depend on how Russia responds. “The coming week will be decisive,” he said.

Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.

Andrew E. Kramer is the Kyiv bureau chief for The Times, who has been covering the war in Ukraine since 2014. More about Andrew E. Kramer

Constant Méheut reports on the war in Ukraine, including battlefield developments, attacks on civilian centers and how the war is affecting its people. More about Constant Méheut

Kim Barker is a Times reporter writing in-depth stories about national issues. More about Kim Barker

Anton Troianovski is the Moscow bureau chief for The Times. He writes about Russia, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. More about Anton Troianovski

Our Coverage of the War in Ukraine

Zelensky Plans Major Shake-Up:   Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, offered to resign  amid plans by President Volodymyr Zelensky to restructure his cabinet in the biggest shake-up since Russia invaded more than two years ago.

Head of Power Company Fired:  The head of Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s electric company, was reportedly blamed for failing to fortify energy infrastructure , which has come under steady Russian bombardment, leading to blackouts.

A Deadly Russian Strike:  Russian missiles struck a military academy in eastern Ukraine, killing more than 50 people  and underscoring Moscow’s superior firepower in one of the war’s deadliest attacks.

Ukraine’s Scarred Students:  As children across Ukraine return to school, a teacher in Kyiv worries for her pupils , many of whom have fled frontline areas or lost family members in the fighting.

How We Verify Our Reporting

Our team of visual journalists analyzes satellite images, photographs , videos and radio transmissions  to independently confirm troop movements and other details.

We monitor and authenticate reports on social media, corroborating these with eyewitness accounts and interviews. Read more about our reporting efforts .